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CASE NOTES

useless ceremony of offering proof" 24 of good motives after his offer
to prove truth was rejected. Although Justice Reed did not think that
the defendant had any probability of proving the defense, he believed
his evidence should have been admitted and evaluated. 25
In upholding as constitutional, for the first time, a group libel statute,
the Beauharnaisdecision seems to solve, in part, the question of whether
such statutes conflict with the right of free speech. This case may, however, be limited in application by future decisions, which, by the reasoning of the majority in the instant case, must be decided in the light of
the particular wording of the statute and factual situation involved.
Though the Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute, it was
made clear that their finding "carries no implication of approval of the
wisdom of the legislation or of its efficacy." 26 However, the decision
is in line with the modern tendency to subordinate the rights of the individual where, in the Court's opinion, it seems necessary to protect the
interests of a large group.
It is interesting to note that the Beauharnais case seems to fall into
the pattern of the Gitlow case, in that it gives great weight to the
legislative deliberations of the state rather than following the more
recent trend which applies the "clear and present danger" doctrine
as exemplified by the Dennis case. It is impossible, of course, to predict
with any degree of accuracy the repercussions of this case, but it may
be relied on in deciding other cases limiting individual rights in favor
of group interests, and, thus, it should be closely scrutinized before
being applied.
TORTS-RECOVERY FOR PRENATAL INJURIES
Plaintiff was en ventre sa mere during the ninth month of pregnancy
when the mother fell down the stairs in defendant's multiple dwelling
house. As a result of the fall, plaintiff came into this world permanently
maimed and disabled. As a defense to the charge of negligence, defendant
relied on a precedent in New York which had refused to allow recovery
for an injury sustained before birth.' The New York Court of Appeals
reversed a judgment in favor of defendant 2 and granted damages to
plaintiff. Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E. 2d 691 (1951).
Beauharnais v. People, 72 S. Ct. 725, 752 (1952).
In 61 Yale L.J. 252, 260 (1952), is expressed the fear that".., giving the defendants
the chance to argue the 'truth' of their hate canards would make the trials soundingboards for their propaganda. Such 'prosecutions' might be warmly welcomed by
professionals."
26
Beauharnais v. People, 72 S.Ct. 725, 736 (1952).
1 Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921); cf. In re Robert's Estate,
158 N.Y. Misc. 698, 286 N.Y. Supp. 476 (Surr. Ct., 1936).
2 Woods v. Lancet, 278 App. Div. 913, 105 N.Y.S. 2d 417 (1951).
24
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In cases regarding property rights, a child is generally considered to
be in existence from the moment of its conception for all beneficial
purposes, such as taking real and personal property by will or intestacy;
and the criminal law has long held that to cause the death of an unborn
child which is viable, or capable of living, is homicide and, consequently,
punishable. 3 However, not until the case of Montreal Tramways v.
Leveille,4 decided by the Supreme Court of Canada, was a child allowed
to recover for prenatal injuries.
in the Leveille case, the child's mother was thrown from defendant's
train due to the negligent operation thereof. Two months later the
mother gave birth to a child with clubfeet. The court reasoned that if a
right of action be denied the child, the child would be compelled
to go through life "carrying the seal of another's fault, and bearing a
very heavy burden of infirmity and inconvenience, without any compensation therefor."5 In the opinion of the court, it was only natural
justice and not sentimentality to allow recovery in such a case. The
court could see no reason why a child should be considered to be in
existence from conception in certain types of cases and not in cases
where a denial of recovery would impose an extreme burden on the child.
In America, however, the overwhelming weight of authority does
not allow recovery even though the child is born alive," and courts are
7
uniform in denying relief when the child is born dead. The first case
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for wrongful death. The court stated that since the child was a part of
its mother at the time of injury, any damage to it was recoverable by
the mother unless such damage was too remote for compensation. Illinois
courts have followed the Dietrich case and have also denied recovery on
3Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.C.D.C., 1946); Tucker v. Carmichael and
Sons, 208 Ga. 201, 65 S.E. 2d 909 (1951); Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, [1933]
4 D.L.R. 337; 1 B1. Comm. **129, 130.
4 [1933] 4 D.L.R. 337.
5 Ibid., at 345.
OBerlin v. J.C. Penney Co., 339 Pa. 547, 16 A. 2d 28 (1940); Newman v. Detroit,
281 Mich. 60, 274 N.W. 710 (1937); Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359,
56 N.E. 638 (1900); Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884);
Stemmer v. Kline, 128 N.J.L. 455, 26 A. 2d 489 (S.Ct., 1942); Rest., Torts §869
(1939).
7 Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W. 2d 229 (1951). Kine v.
Zuckerman, 4 Pa. D. & C. 227 (1924), later overruled by Berlin v. J.C. Penney Co.,
339 Pa. 547, 16 A. 2d 28 (1940), allowed recovery for prenatal injuries on the
condition precedent that the child be born alive.
8138 Mass. 14 (1884).
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the ground that the child had no separate existence of its own when
the injuries were sustained.9
Generally, courts advance two basic reasons for denying damages
for prenatal injuries. The first and most frequently used reason is that
the defendant can owe no duty to a "person" who is not yet in existence
at the time of the injury. 10 Secondly, courts find a reason because of
the difficulty in proving any causal connection between the negligence
and the damage; these courts are fearful of speculation, conjecture, and
fictitious claims. 1
Scott v. McPheeters12 was one of the first American cases to allow
recovery for prenatal injuries. The case arose when a doctor negligently
used clamps and forceps in the delivery of a baby, resulting in serious
injuries to the child's brain cells and spine. Damages were allowed on
the basis of a statute which provided:
A child conceived, but not yet born, is to be deemed an existing person, so
far as it may be necessary for its interests in the event of its subsequent birth.' 3
Thus, the theory that a child exists from the moment of its conception
was extended to a case where a child sought damages for a prenatal
injury. 14
Prior to the Scott case, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, though it
15
denied recovery, in Lipps v. Milwaukee Ry. and Light Company, implied that if the child had been .viable at the time when the injury was
inflicted, the defendant might have been held liable. In the Lipps case,
plaintiff was en ventre sa mere in the fifth month of pregnancy when
defendant's negligent conduct caused the injury. Although at the time
the child was not capable of living, it was, however, subsequently born
alive. The court concluded that since the child was non-viable at the
time the damage was inflicted, the child's rights were merged with
those of the mother.
Since Scott v. McPheeters,16 and prior to the instant case, five juris9 Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900); Smith v. Luckhardt, 299 II. App. 100, 19 N.E. 2d 446 (1939).

10 Berlin v. J.C. Penney Co., 339 Pa. 547, 16 A. 2d 28 (1940); Allaire v. St. Luke's
Hospital, 184 I1. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900); Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton,
138 Mass. 14 (1884).
11 Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W. 2d 944
(1935); Prosser, Torts S 31 (1941).
12

33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P. 2d 678 (1939).

'3Cal. Civil Code (1949) Div. 1, Pt. 1, S 29.
14 Recovery was also based on a statute in Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352 (La.
App., 1923). (The case was furnished by the court for publication in 1949.)
15 164 Wis. 272, 159 N.W. 916 (1916).
16 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P. 2d 678 (1939).
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dictions have refused the argument that only the legislature could allow
the granting of relief, and recovery has been sustained without statutory authorization.17 Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc.,'8 represents
the first decision by a state supreme court that a child, surviving birth,
can bring an action for injuries incurred before birth in the absence
of a statute. The court held:
No legislative action is required to authorize recovery for personal injuries
caused by the negligence of another. Such right was one existing at common
law.
To hold that the plaintiff in the instant case did not suffer an injury in
her person would require this court to announce that as a matter of law the
infant is a part of the mother until birth and has no existence in law until that
time. In our view such a ruling would deprive the infant of the right conferred
by the Constitution upon all persons, by the application of a time-worn fiction
not founded on fact and within common knowledge untrue and unjustified. 19
The Ohio court went on to state that medical progress has advanced
to a point where it is now easier to detect the cause of the injury and
that there is no longer any need to worry about suits brought in bad
faith.
20
Supporting the reasoning advanced in Montreal Tramways v. Leveille,
two courts could see no reason why there should be any difference between a criminal suit, where the wrongful conduct of the defendant
has caused the death of the unborn child, and a civil suit, where de21
fendant's conduct has caused severe injuries to the infant.
The trend of modern reasoning toward allowing recovery for prenatal
injuries was originated in a dissenting opinion in the Illinois case of
Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital.2 2 The broad language in the Lipps case
gave impetus to the movement. Certainly, the Canadian Leveille case
had a substantial effect on American jurisdictions. With decisions in
the District of Columbia, 23 Minnesota,24 Ohio,2 5 Maryland,2 6 and Geor17Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.C.D.C., 1946); Tucker v. Carmichael
and Sons, 208 Ga. 201, 65 S.E. 2d 909 (1951); Demasiewiz v. Gorsuch, 79 A. 2d
550 (Md., 1950); Jasinsky v. Potts, 153 Ohio St. 529, 92 N.E. 2d 809 (1950);
Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E. 2d 335 (1949);
Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W. 2d 839 (1949).
18 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E. 2d 335 (1949).
20 [1933] 4 D.L.R. 337.
19 Ibid., at 128 and 340.
21 Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.C.D.C., 1946); Tucker v. Carmichael
and Sons, 208 Ga. 201, 65 S.E. 2d 909 (1951).
22 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
23

Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.C.D.C., 1946).
Verkennes v. Comiea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W. 2d 838 (1949).
25 Jasinsky v. Ports, 153 Ohio St. 529, 92 N.E. 2d 809 (1950);
Villiams v. Marion
Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E. 2d 335 (1949).
26 Damasiewiz v. Gorsuch, 79 A. 2d 550 (Md., 1950).
24
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gia it would seem that the movement was well under way even though
these jurisdictions had no applicable statutes on which relief could be
predicated. Woods v. Lancet,2s the instant case, adds more authority to
an equitable view which grants relief to a child injured en ventre sa mere.
Furthermore, in an enlightened scientific and medical age the causal
connection between the negligence and the resulting injury can be
accurately traced and presented through competent medical evidence.
It would seem then that to allow recovery for prenatal injuries is the
better and more logical view, notwithstanding the weight of authority
to the contrary.
PROPERTY-EFFECT OF MURDER AND SUICIDE ON RIGHT
OF SURVIVORSHIP IN JOINT TENANCY
A husband and wife held certain real and personal property as joint
tenants. The husband murdered the wife and immediately committed
suicide. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, three judges dissenting,
held that even though the wife had died, under the circumstances, her
status as joint tenant continued in her administrator and heirs at law,
and when the husband died and his life interest ended, the entire property of the joint tenancy became the wife's estate of inheritance and
passed to her administrator and heirs at law. In re King's Estate, 261
Wis. 384, 52 N.W. 2d 885 (1952).
The administrator of the husband's estate contended that to deprive
the husband of his right of survivorship would not only be an interference by the court with the statutes of descent,1 but would also work
attainder and corruption of blood in violation of the Wisconsin Constitution 2 and the United States Constitution.8 The contention regarding
the statutes of descent was disposed of by the court's adoption of the
general rule which holds that upon the death of one joint tenant, the
devolution of the property is an incident of the joint tenancy, without
regard to the laws of inheritance or statutes of descent. 4
The court stated that there could be no attainder or corruption of
the blood for, under the Wisconsin view of the law, the estate of the
wife as joint tenant never vested in the husband, even though she had
27
Tucker v. Carmichael and Sons, 208 Ga. 201, 65 S.E. 2d 909 (1951).
28303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E. 2d 691 (1951).
1Wis. Stat. (1947) c. 237.
2Wis. Const. Art. I, S 12.
3 U. S. Const. Art. 1, §9.
4United States v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 363 (1939); Anson v. Murphy, 149 Neb. 716,
32 N.W. 2d 271 (1948); Hoeffner v. Hoeffner, 389 IMl.253, 59 N.E. 2d 684 (1945);
Edge v. Barrow, 316 Mass. 104, 55 N.E. 2d 5 (1944); 2 Tiffany, Real Property
§419 (3rd ed., 1939).

